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LEWIS L. MALTBY * & DAVID C. YAMADA **
INTRODUCTION
The past thirty years have witnessed a significant growth in federal
statutory law designed to protect workers from discrimination.' In
order to qualify for protection under these statutes, however, an indi-
vidual must meet the statutory definition of "employee." 2 Thus, federal
* Director, American Civil Liberties Union, National Task Force on Civil Liberties in the
Workplace. BA., 1969, J.D., 1972, University of Pennsylvania.
** Assistant Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. BA., Valparaiso University, 1981,
J.D., New York University, 1985, M.A. Candidate (Labor), Empire State College.
Professor Theodore St. Antoine, University of Michigan Law School, provided insightful
comments and suggestions at both the formulation and drafting stages of this Article. Professor
Marc Greenbaum, Suffolk University Law School, provided helpful feedback on an earlier draft
of this Article. In addition, Thomas Nardone and Jay Meisenheimer of the United States Bureau
of Labor Statistics supplied timely information concerning the contingent workforce. Finally,
Madeleine Wright of the Suffolk University Law Library, Stif101k University law students James
Corbo, Paul Dullea, and Shelly Easter, and ACLU student interns Kieran Brown and Jordan Siegel
provided helpful research assistance.
I See, e.g., Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e•17 (1994) ("Title VII");
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C, §§ 621-54 (1994) ("ADEA"); Americans with
Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2101-214 (1994) ("ADA").
2 See infra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
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employment discrimination statutes typically do not protect someone
classified as an independent contractor:4
The problems facing independent contractors and other contin-
gent workers in the American workforce have received growing atten-
tion of late, and policy proposals—designed to address them abound.'
One common observation has been that by classifying their workers as
„independent contractors rather than as employees, employers may be
',..ableto evade the requirements of various federal labor and employ-
ment laws.5
 By, far the most popular response to this problem has been
the recommendation that the statutory definition of "employee" be
determined pursuant to an "economic realities" test, whereby a worker
who is economically dependent on her employer would be defined as
an employee, regardless of how the employer chooses to label her.'
While we agree that independent contractors do not get a fair
shake under current employment and labor statutes, we do not believe
that the economic realities test is the best solution, nor do we support
the adoption of a single definition of "employee" for all of these
statutes.' The question of whether independent contractors should fall
within the aegis of statutes designed to protect workers does not yield
a single, blanket analysis and answer. After all, the purposes and op-
erations of, for example, the Fair Labor Standards Act("FLSA") differ
from those of the Occupational Safety and Health Act ("OSHA"). As
discussed below, the task of defining "employee" should be conducted
separately for different types of employment-related statutes, particu-
larly when statutes such as FLSA affect labor market competition much
more directly than statutes such as OSHA. 8
3 See text accompanying infra notes 102-03.
•1 See generally COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF WORKER-MANAGEMEN'F RELATIONS, U.S. DEPT
OF LABOR, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 35-41 (1994) (containing policy recommendations
concerning contingent workforce) [hereinafter DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT]; Symposium, Tice
Regulatory Future of Contingent Employment, 52 WAsui. & LEE L. REV. 723 (1995) (articles dis-
cussing legal and policy issues affecting contingent workers); Prepared Statement of Anthony P
Carnevale, Chair, National Commission for Employment Policy Before the House Economic and Edu-
cational Opportunities Committee Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, FED. NEWS SERVICE,
Apr. 4, 1995, at 1, available in LEX1S, News Library, Fednew File (testimony before congressional
subcommittee concerning contingent workforce) [hereinafter Carnevale].
5 See, e.g., DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 37-38; Carnevale, supra note 4, at 3.
' 5 See, e.g., DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 4, at 38-39; Nancy E. Dowd, The Test of
Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. Ri:v. 75, 112-14 (1984);
Carnevale, supra note 4, at 5.
7
 See infra notes 53-62 and accompanying text.
8 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-09, 651-78 (1994). The major provisions of FLSA cover minimum
wage and overtime pay standards, restrictions on child labor and equal pay requirements. 29
U.S.C. §§ 201-09. OSHA sets forth minimum national standards governing workplace safety. 29
U.S.C. §§ 651-78.
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Nevertheless, the major federal discrimination laws—Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act ("Title VII"),9 the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act ("ADEA"),L° the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"),"
and Section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act'can be fairly grouped
together when considering the independent contractor question. Such
an analysis leads to the identification of several similar policy themes
and, in our view, a common resolution. 13
Accordingly, this Article addresses the status of independent con-
tractors under federal discrimination laws.' 4 We first will consider how
and where independent contractors fit into the modern workforce.''
9 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-l7 (1994). Title VII prohibits employment discrimination on
the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id. § 2000e-2(c).
11) See 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994). The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of age, /4. § 623.
11 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-214 (1994). The ADA prohibits, in pertinent part, employment
discrimination on the basis of disability. Id. §§ 12112(a).
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Revised Statutes Section 1977A. Section . 1981 provides that all persons
in the United States shall have the same right to "make and enibrce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of
persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." Id.
As the discussion below will explain, Section 1981 is frequently invoked with other federal
statutes in discrimination suits.
13 See infra notes 160-92 and accompanying text.
14 For previous scholarly treatments of this and related topics. see John Brunti., The Em-
ployee/Mile/v.1111ml Contractor Dichotomy.: A Rose is Not Always a Rose, 8 HOFSTRA LAB. U. 337
(1991); Dowd, supra note 6; James E. Holloway, A Primer on Employment Policy fur Contingent
Work: Less Employment Regulation Through Enver Employer-Employee Relations, '20 T. MARSHALL L.
Ruv. 27 (1994); Valerie U. Jacobson, Bringing a Title VII Action: Which Test Regarding Standing to
Sue Is the Most Applicable?, 18 FORDHAM DKR. L.J. 95 (1990); Henry H. Perritt,Jr.„Should Some
Independent Contractors Be Redefined as "Employees" Under Labor Law?, 33 yn.L. L km'. 989 (1988);
Patricia Davidson, Comment, The Definition of Employee" Under'1'itle. VII: Distinguishing Between
Employees and Independent Contractors, 53 U. GIN. L. REV. 203, (1984); William J. Duensing,
Comment, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zipp6 Manufacturing Co.: Choice of a
Test for Coverage of the Age. Discrimination in Employment Act, 64 B.C. L. REV. 1145 (1984).
The legal status of independent contractors under federal diSerimination laws and other
statutes has drawn considerable attention from the practicing bar; as evidenced by the frequent
treatment of the topic in practitioner-oriented law journals cord practice treatises, See generally
HENRY H. PERREIT, JR., EMPLOYEE DISMISSAI. LAW & PRACTICE § 7.2, at 63-64 (1992); Labor
Dep't of Gilason, Dunn & Crutcher, A Guide to Employment Discrimination 'Litigation, in ALI -ABA
COURSE STUDY ON ADVANCED EMPLOYMENT LAW & LITIGATION 457, 475 (1992); Scott E Cooper,
The Expanding Use of the Contingent Workforce in the American Economy: New Opportunities and
Dangers for Employers, 20 EMPLOYEE REL. L ,f . 525 (1995); John P. Furfaro & Maury B. Josephson,
Independent Contractors—Part II, N.Y. L.J., June 3, 1994, at 3; Rick A, Pacyriski, Legal Challenges
in Using Independent Contractors, 72 Mimi. BJ. 671 (1993); L. Lynne Pulliam, Temporary Employ-
ees: What Are an Employers EEO Responsibilities?, 18 EMPLOYEE' REL. 14. 533 (1992); Lawrence
Schism, Age Discrimination Litigation: Who Is an "Employee," What Is, an "Employer"?. 83 ILL. B.J.
120 (1995); Henry W. Sledz, Jr. & John J. Lynch, The Legal Ramifications of Using Independent
Contractors, Temporary Agency Employees, Leased 'Porkers, 9 CBA REG: 20 (1995).
15 See infra notes 21-45 and accompanying text.
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Secondly, we shall discuss how Congress and the courts have delineated
between employees and independent contractors in interpreting the
reach of federal discrimination laws.' 6
 Thirdly, we will examine some
of the proposals that have been made to include independent contrac-
tors under federal discrimination laws)?
Finally, we will present our thesis that there is no principled reason
for excluding independent contractors under federal discrimination
statutes, and that the best way to provide such protection is to amend
the statutes to explicitly include independent contractors.' 8 As we dis-
cuss below, this approach is not without potential complications but,
after considering the alternatives, it is clear that this is the fairest and
most workable option.' 9
1. INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS IN TODAY'S IATORKPLACE
There has been a growing consensus among those in the field of
industrial relations that the legal and economic status of independent
contractors and contingent workers requires greater attention. 2° Most
notable have been the deliberations and findings of the Commission
on the Future of Worker-Management Relations, a blue-ribbon panel
commonly known as the Dunlop Commission after its chairperson,
_John Dunlop. 2 ' The Commission's 1994 Report and Recommendations
concerning labor and industrial policy in the United States covered a
wide range of topics, including contingent workers. 22 Although the
Commission stated that "it is beyond our means to recommend a full
policy program in this emerging area of concern" (i.e., the contingent
workforce), it did recognize that "[t]he single most important factor
in determining which workers are covered by employment and labor
statutes is the way the line is drawn between employees and inde-
pendent contractors."2"
Another bipartisan panel, the National Commission for Employ-
ment Policy ("NCEP"), expressed similar concerns about independent
contractors. 24
 Testifying before a congressional subcommittee, NCEP
i" See infra notes 46-124 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 125-59 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 160-90 and accompanying text.
19 See id.
2<' See, e.g., Dum.or CommismoN REpoRT , supra note 4; generally Symposium, supra note 4.
21 Sc DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, MOM note 4, at 35-41.
22 Id.
23 Id. at 37. The Commission's specific recommendations to address the independent con-
tractor issue are discussed infra notes 127-37 and accompanying text.
24




chair Anthony Carnevale observed that "the• federal protections af-
forded full-time, permanent employees [frequently] do not extend to
the contingent workforce.... When actual employees are misclassified
as independent contractors, they lose their protections."'
The deliberations of these commissions and panels have comple-
mented other studies about the contingent workforce and spurred
further investigation.' 6 Most importantly, we are starting to gain both
an empirical understanding of independent contractors as a segment
of the workforce and a structural understanding of their role in the
modern economy.
A. Developing a Statistical Portrait
The distinctions between employees and independent contractors
are unsettled both inside and outside the realm of statutory law, thus
making it hard to assess how many workers are treated by hiring
entities as independent contractors. However, the picture is beginning
to sharpen. In 1995, the Bureau of Labor Statistics ("BLS") released its
first-ever detailed examination of contingent and alternative employ-
ment relationships. 27 According to the survey, some 8.3 million work-
ers, representing 6.7% of the total work force, identified themselves as
independent contractors. 28 This estimate included "all those who iden-
tified themselves as independent contractors, consultants, and free-
lance workers ... , regardless of whether they were identified as wage
and salary workers or self-employed[,] in the responses to basic .. .
labor Ibrce status questions." 2'' In terms of demographic characteristics,
those who were classified as independent contractors:
were considerably more likely than workers in traditional
arrangements to be men, white, and at least 25 years old; they
don, community-based organizations and government," and their purpose was to advise Congress
and the Executive Branch oil employment policy. Sec id,
25 Id. These "federal protections" considered by the NCEI' include the FI-SA, the Equal Pay
Act, Title VII, ADEA, Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA") and the Worker's
Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. See id.
29 See, e.g., U.S. DEP'• OF LABOR, BUREAU or LABOR STATISTICS, CONTINGFNT ANO ALTER-
NATIVE. EMPLOYMENT ARRANCENIENTS, Report MO (1995) [hereinafter BLS SURVEY],
27 See generally BLS SuRVEY, supra note 26.
25 1d. at 1.
29 Id. at 5. Ibis ever, the BLS cautioned against drawing inferences from the data concerning
the number of workers "who [may have been1 'converted' to independent contractors to avoid
legal requirements," observing that:
Two individuals who arc in exactly the same work arrangeMent may answer the
question from the mail questionnaire—"Were you employed by government, by a
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also were more likely to be out of school and have at least a
bachelor's degree. They were somewhat more likely than
traditional workers to work part time and to hold managerial,
professional, sales, or precision production jobs. In terms of
industries, they were more likely to work in construction,
agriculture, and services, and less likely to work in manufac-
turing or wholesale and retail trade.'"'
It is difficult to draw from these demographic findings any firm
conclusions on whether there exists a greater need to apply discrimina-
tion laws to independent contractors than to those who fit into more
traditional employment patterns. On one hand, because members of
traditionally protected groups—women, people of color, and older
private company, a non-profit organization, or were you self-employed?"—differently
depending on their interpretation of the words "employed " and "self-employed." 11 was
not Matilde . . . to collect information on the MO aspects of employment arrangements.
14. (emphasis added). Thus, although the BLS survey constitutes the most extensive effort to date
toward assessing the status of workers who hall outside of the category of traditional full-time
employee, it is impossible to determine from this data how many of these workers would be
defined as employees under any of the federal employment discrimination laws.
Furthermore, the BLS study has unwittingly added to some of the confusion over where
independent contractors Ft into the classifications of employment relationships--even if in the
long run its categorizations make the most sense and hopefully will prevail. The Dunlop Com-
mission placed independent contractors within the broad category of contingent workers, stating
that contingent workers include "independent contractors and part-time, temporary, seasonal,
and leased workers." DUNLOP COMMISSION REPowr, supra note 4, at 35. The BLS, too, recognized
that contingent employment has come to mean "almost any work arrangement that might be
considered to differ from the commonly perceived norm of a full-time wage and salary job." 13LS
SURVEY, ,Vt/Pra note 26, at 1.
However, under the BLS survey, the detertninaticins of who is an independent contractor
and who is a contingent worker are separate inquiries, distinguishing between the nature of work
relationships in terms of duration and security and the characteristics of alternative work arrange-
!TIMIS. Id. at 4-5. Questions about contingent employment were handled separately from those
concerning alternative arrangements, such as independent contractors, workers "on call" and
workers for temp agencies. See id. at 2-4. Having drawn that distinction, the BLS defined
contingent workers as "individuals who do not perceive themselves as having an implicit or
explicit contract for ongoing employment." Id. at I. Under die B1S formulation, an independent
contractor could be considered a contingent worker, but not necessarily so. See id. at 2-4.
IBIS analyst Thomas Nardone pointed out that it is illogical to automatically classify: inde-
pendent contractors as contingent workers. Telephone Interview with Thomas Nardone, Analyst,
BLS (May 15, 1996) (notes on file with co-author David Yamada). Under such a scheme, an
independent contractor who employs 10 workers would be considered a "contingent worker,"
while the 10 workers would be considered employees. See id.
3D BLS SURVEY, MOM note 26, at 3.
Much remains to be learned about the statistical characteristics of the independent contrac-
tor worklOrce. For example, currently the BLS data do not distinguish between the individual
who contracts with an employer solely on her own behalf and the small company with employees
of its own that contracts to do work for other companies. Also, although the survey showed that
contingent workers -are slightly more likely than noncontingent workers to be women and black,"
March 19971	 INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS	 245
workers—are less likely to be classified as independent contractors,
discrimination law should be concentrated on the sectors in which they
are most likely to work.
However, industries such as construction and agriculture are
dominated by white males, thus suggesting a need to address under-
representation of protected groups regardless of whether the workers
are employees or independent contractors. In addition, because the
BLS survey was not designed with statutory enforcement in mind, it is
impossible to determine whether those who fall into the group labeled
by the BLS as independent contractors would he similarly labeled
under the current tests used by courts in determining coverage under
discrimination laws."'
B. The Dynamics of the Modern American Economy
Although the BLS survey did not attempt to document trends
concerning any increase over time in the number of independent
contractors, there is strong evidence that an upward trend exists, a
reflection of a labor market that is less hospitable to the notion of
secure, full-time employment. In his examination of the American
labor market, MIT economist Paul Osterman observed that "perhaps
the first time since the Great Depression, there are widespread indica-
tions that internal labor market structures are changing." 32 Traditional
blue collar and white collar employment patterns, characterized by
some degree of job security, are giving way to more fluid, less secure
arrangements such as "part-time work, temporary help services, and
other forms of' flexible labor.""
Carnegie Mellon University economist Bennett Harrison has la-
beled this phenomenon "numerical flexibility, whereby jobs are redes-
igned so as to substitute part-time, contract, and other 'contingent'
workers . . . for full-time employees."' Largely in an effort to cut per-
sonnel costs, more companies are treating individuals as independent
contractors, sometimes by making unilateral decisions to designate
it is not known whether this pattern holds true fOr the subgroup of independent contractors who
work on a contingent basis, See id. at I. and significantly, because the BLS survey is the
first effort to produce extensive data on alternative employment arrangements, it did riot generate
official data documenting any trends concerning the growth of the independent contractor sector
of the workforce. See id.
31 See id. at 5.
Si PAUL OSTERMAN, EMI'LIEVAENT FUTURES: REORGANIZATION, DISLOCATION, AND PUBLIC
MUM" 68 (1988).
:III Id.
BENNETE HARRISON, LEAN AND MEAN 130 (1994).
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individuals or positions previously classified as employees as indepen-
dent contractors.'' In some instances companies have laid off work-
ers, only to offer them positions as independent contractors, with the
same job responsibilities as before but with lower pay and few or no
benefits."
A second form of numerical flexibility "is evident in the tendency
of managers to outsource production, maintenance, catering, clerical,
and other activities that arguably were formerly . . undertaken in-
house'."37
 In an expansive study of the role of small firms in the modern
economy, Harrison concluded that when such firms do emerge, they
are often dependent upon large companies for business." Many of
these small, legally-independent firms supply parts, components and
services to large firms in a way that "power, finance, and control remain
concentrated in the hands of the managers of the largest companies
in the global economy." 9 This model of flexible, large firm-led produc-
tion networks permits large firms to retain economic leverage without
centralizing their operations..w
The rapid growth of temporary help agencies is another sign that
the independent contractor sector is expanding, especially relative to
the workforce generally: "From 1978 to 1985, the temporary help
industry grew eight times faster than all nonagricultural industries.
From 1982 to 1990, the temporary help industry grew ten times faster
than the work force as a whole."' According to the 1995 BLS survey,
See, e.g.. Clare Ansberry, Down the up Escalator: Why Some Workers Are Falling Behind, WALL
Si. j., Mar. 11, 1993, at Al; Dale Russakoff & Cindy Skrzycki, Growing Pains in the "Contingent
Work Force"; Employers Gain Flexibility as Part-Timers Lose Benefits, Secutity, WASH. PosT, Feb. 11,
1988, at Al; John NI. Trite, "Contingetny Workers" Frayed Safely Net, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 13, 1993,
at 7.
36 See, e.g., Ansberry, .supra note 55, at AI. For example, Lou Capozzola worked 10 years at
Sports Illustrated, jetting from Super Bowls to the Olympics as a lighting specialist. See id. He was
on the road 180 days each year, working 15-to-20 !Rim days. See id.
In February 1990, he was called into his boss's office and informed that his job was being
eliminated, but that he could continue as an independent contractor. See id. His base pay would
he approximately halved to $20,000. See id. His wcrti nc pay would be cut by as much as
two-thirds. See id. And he could forget about his $20,000-a-year benefit package, including medical
coverage. See id.; see also Tyne, supra note 35, at 7 (bank teller with 22 years at job fired and
"immediately offered back the same position," but only as part-time, hourly worker with no
benefits). Fur all overview of this growing phenomenon, see Louis Uchnelle, More Downsized
Workers Are Returning as Rentals, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 1996, at 1.
37
 HARRISON, ,S1(pra note 34, at 130.
38 Id. at 41-47.
3" Id. at 47.
IS See id.
11 Patricia Schroeder, Does the Growth in the Contingent Work Force Demand a Change in Federal
Policy?, 52 WAsn. & LEE L. REV. 731, 731-32 (1995) (referring to studies contained in NEW
POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME AND CONTINGENT WORKFORCE (Virginia L. duRivage ed., 1992)).
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some 1.2 million people worked for temporary help agencies. 42 Tem-
porary help agency workers "were more likely than workers in tradi-
tional arrangements to be women, young, and black." 3
All of these effects—"companies" or "employers" treating individu-
als as independent contractors rather than employees, large firms
contracting out work to small firms, and the groWth of temporary help
agencies—increase the net number of independent contractors. The
specific policy ramifications concerning federal discrimination law will
be explored in greater detail below.'"
11. Ti-u S'r1vrus OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS UNDER
FEDERAL Disc RIMINATION STATUTES45
A. Title VII, the ADEA, and the ADA 46
Title VII defines an "employee" as "an individual employed by an
employer."A 7 The A.DEA and the ADA use identical language. 48 judicial
attempts to further determine the meaning of "employee" under the
During a period of roughly 18 months (from January 1993 to 	 1994), Manpower, Inc., a
temporary help agency based in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, accounted for "more than 2% of all of
the new jobs in the United States." See James Risen, Thmporary Employment Industry Working
Overtime Jobs, L.A. 'TIMES, July 5, 1994, at I. In 1993, Manpower employed 640,000 American
workers on a temporary basis. See id.
42 BLS SuavEv, supra note 26, at 1.
is See id.
41 See infra notes 87-103 and accompanying text,
45 There are four major legal theories of discrimination against those who fall within a
protected class, such as race or sex:
Individual disparate treatment, for intentional discrimination against au individual
its a protected category;
Systemic disparate treatment, for intentional discrimination against a group within
a protected category;
Systemic disparate impact, for a facially-neutral employment practice that neverthe-
less discriminates against a group within a protected category; and
Failure to provide reasonable accommodation, on the basis of disability or religious
preference.
See MARK A. ROTHSTEIN I71' Al.., EMPLOYMENT LAW 96-97, 111-15, 128-32, 163-64, 189-90 (1994).
46 This section provides a summary of the evolution of standards used by courts to determine
employee status under Title VII, the AREA and the ADA. Over the years courts have adopted
one of three standards: the common-law, hybrid or economic realities test. Obviously, such an
understanding is central to developing our main thesis. However, we have kept this section brief
for two reasons: first, much of the legislative and case history has been ably discussed by other
scholars, most notably Professor Dowd. See Dowd, supra note 6, at 80-112; Jacobson, supra note
14, at 105-14; Davidson, supra note 14, at 207-22. Second, as we discuss in greater detail below,
the distinctions between the three tests are relatively minor at the point of application. See infra
notes 87-103 and accompanying text.
47 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1994).
48 See 29 U.S.C. § 630(1) (ADEA) (1994); 42 U,S.C. § 12111(4) (ADA) (1994).
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statutes have led to the adoption of one of three tests: the common
law test, the economic realities test, or the hybrid test.
1. Common-Law Test, Round I
Some earlier decisions adopted the common-law test for determin-
ing employee status, under which the central inquiry was whether the
employer had the "right to control" not only "the result accomplished
by the work," but also "the details and means by which that result is
accomplished."' For example, in Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a district
court finding that a janitor/custodian was not an employee for pur-
poses of Title VIP° Although the court recognized that the company
had provided some direction to the plaintiff concerning the details of
his work and had supplied the tools and materials, it found persuasive
that the plaintiff's hours were flexible, that "he was not told the details
of how to perform" the job, and that the plaintiff in some instances
was assisted by his wife andson, without the company's approval.''' In
addition, the court was influenced by the plaintiff's description of
himself as being self-employed and by his acknowledgement that he
worked in a similar manner for two other companies. 52
The common-law test did not become the majority approach.
During the late the 1970s and early 1980s, most courts adopted either
the economic realities test or, more frequently, a hybrid test that com-
bined elements of the common-law and economic realities tests.
2. Economic Realities Test
As some courts began to focus on the broad remedial scope of
Title VII and the AREA, they rejected the common-law test as being
overly restrictive and instead applied an economic realities test to de-
termine employee status. 53 In the leading case of Armbruster v. Quinn,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that
49 Smith v. Dutra Trucking Co., 410 F. Supp. 513, 516 (N.D. Cal. 1976), offd, 580 F.2d 1054
(9th Cir. 1978); see Cobb v. Sun Papers, Inc., 673 F.2d 337, 339-41 (11th Cir. 1982); Takcall v.
Werd, Inc., 23 Fair Empl. I'rac. Cas. (BNA) 947, 948 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Dumas v. Town of Mount
Vernon, 436 F. Stipp. 866, 872-73 (S.D. Ala. 1977), modified on other grounds, 612 F.2d 974, 980
(5th Cir. 1980).
5°673 F.2d at 342.
51 Id. at 34112.
52 See id. at 342.
53 See, e.g., Lilley v. BTM Corp., 958 F.2d 740, 750 (6th Cir. 1992) (applied economic realties
to ADFA); Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160-61 (5th Cir. 1986) (applied
economic realities to Title VII); Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Dowd & Dowd,
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"one must examine the economic realities underlying the relationship
between the individual and the so-called principal" to determine em-
ployee status." Nine years later, in Lilley v. BTM Corp., the same court
explained that the economic realities test "looks to whether the puta-
tive employee is economically dependent upon the principal or is in-
stead in business for himself.... [It] is a loose formulation, leaving the
determination of employment status to case-by-case resolution based
on the totality of the circumstances." 55
The advantages and disadvantages of the economic realities test
are analyzed more fully below, but at this juncture it is important to
note that the formulation of the test, at least as adopted by the Sixth
Circuit, was logically inconsistent from the outset. It is possible, for
example, for someone to be both "economically dependent upon the
principal" and "in business for himself." 5" An individual who runs a
catering business but who has one major client would fall into this
category.
Furthermore, as applied by the courts, the test has emphasized
the company's control over the individual instead of the individual's
economic dependence on the company! For example, in finding that
a sales representative paid by commission was an employee for pur-
poses of the ADEA, the Sixth Circuit in Lilley recognized that the
company exercised control over the plaintiff, supplied the plaintiff
with an office and supplies, and integrated the plaintiff into the com-
pany's business operations. 58 Although the court also acknowledged
that the plaintiff sold only the company's products, it cautioned that
"this is by no means determinative." 59
Whereas the Lilley court used the control fiictor to find that an
employment relationship existed, other courts nominally adopting the
economic realities test have, in fact, applied a right-to-control analysis
more consistent with the aforementioned common-law test and the
hybrid test discussed below to bar plaintiffs from proceeding with their
lawsuits. 6° For example, in Broussard v. L.H. Bossier, Inc., the United
Ltd., 736 F.2d 1177, 1 178 (7th Cir. 1984) (same); Armbruster v. Quinn, 711 F.2d 1332, 1340 (Oth
Cir. 1983) (same); Robinson v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 899 F. Stipp. 848, 849 (D.N.II. 1995)
(applied economic realities to ADA); Hyland v. New Haven Radiology Assoc., 606 F. Stipp. 617,
620 (D. Conn. 1985) (applied economic realities to AREA).
54 711 R2clai 1340.
5` 958 F.2d at 750.
56 See id.
57 See, e.g., Lilley, 958 F.2d at 750; Bnoussaul, 789 F.2d at 1160-61.
55 Id.
See, e,g,, Broussard, 789 E2d at 1160-61; Robinson, 899 F. Stipp. at 849.
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States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit invoked the economic
realities test before concluding that the "right to control" was the most
important factor in its decision to dismiss a Title VII claim by a co-
owner of a trucking company.''' Similarly, in Robinson v. Bankers Life &
Casualty Co., the United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire also invoked the economic realities test and stated that the
"general absence of company control" was one factor that led to its
dismissal of an insurance agent's ADA claim."'
Thus, the factor of economic dependence has been marginalized
or even swept aside by courts that have claimed to adopt the economic
realities test. This casts doubt on any assertion that the blanket appli-
cation of some type of economic realities test would truly result in
greater coverage for independent contractors under the discrimina-
tion laws.
3. Hybrid Test
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit in Spirides v. Reinhardt, a Title VII case, articulated
the so-called hybrid test, which calls for an examination of the eco-
nomic realities of the work relationship but emphasizes, consistent with
the common law test, "the extent of the employer's right to control the
'means and manner' of the worker's performance."63 Many federal
courts adopted the hybrid test and it became the favored standard for
claims under both Title VII and the ADEA."
Consistent with the Spirides court's formulation, most courts ap-
plying the hybrid test have emphasized right to control over economic
dependence, in most instances using the former to support a finding
that the plaintiff was not an employee." 5 Two decisions demonstrate
789 F.2c1 at 1160-61. The court referred to the economic realities test while citing to
,Spirides a. Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826 (D.C. Cir. 1979), a seminal hybrid test case. Id. at 1160.
62 1199 E Stipp. at 849.
til	 E2c1 at 831.
61 See Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1993) ("wider trend" has been to apply
hybrid test); see, e.g., Lambert.sen v. Utah Dcp't of Corrections, 79 F.3d 1024, 1028 (10th Cir.
1996) (applying hybrid test to Title VII); Mares v. Marsh, 777 F.2d 1066, 1067 (5th Cir. 1985)
(same); Equal Employment Opportunity. Commission v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir.
1983) (applying hybrid test to ADEA); Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 657 F.2d 909, 915 11.8
(7th Cir. 1981) (applying hybrid test to Title VII).
' 15 Sc,', e.g., Lambertsen, 79 F.3d. at 1028-29 (Corrections Department did not exercise control
over teaching assistant); Knight v. United Farm Bureau Mut. ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377, 379 (7th Cir.
1991) (insurance agent an independent contractor); Marrs, 777 F.2d at 1067-69 (grocery bagger
at Army commissary not Army employee); Zippo, 713 F.2c1 at 38 (district sales manager not
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the degree to which right to control has been emphasized over eco-
nomic dependence.
Knight v. United Farm Bureau Insurance Co. involved a Title VII
claim brought by one of United Farm Bureau's insurance agents. 6" The
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit approved of the
lower court's reasoning which found that although the plaintiff was
trained by defendant Farm Bureau and not permitted to sell insurance
contracts for any other insurance company, the agent enjoyed wide
freedom to choose her sales methods and select which Farm Bureau
products to sell.''' In addition, the plaintiff was "free to leave [the
company] at any time and use her skills to work for other insurance
companies."" The Seventh Circuit also noted that the district court
considered that "the agents' sales are integral to Farm Bureau's busi-
ness."`'"
Knight is a stunning case in several ways. Although freedom to
choose sales methods and product lines are logical considerations
under right to control, the court's reasoning that the plaintiff could
pick up and leave at any time suggests that the mere existence of a
contract terminable at will cuts against a finding of employee status. 7"
Under this rationale, even the most traditional employees would have
trouble gaining standing to sue if they are employed on an at-will basis.
Furthermore, rather than simply ignoring the economic dependence
factor of the economic realities test, the court turned it inside out by
inquiring about the defendant's economic dependence upon its agents
rather than the other way around. 71
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Zippo Manufacturing
Co. did not involve such a contorted application of the hybrid test, but
employee); Ost v, West Suhttellan Travelers Limousine, Inc., No. 94-0-3874, 1995 WL 330911, al
*3 (N.D. III. May 31, 1995), afrd, 88 F',3d 435, 438 (7111 Cir. 1996) (limousine driver an inde-
pendent contractor); Dake v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., 600 F. Supp. 03, 65 (N.D. Ohio 1984)
(insurance agent an independent contractor); Dixon v. Burman, 593 F. Stipp. 6, 10-11 (N.D. Ind.
1983) (same). Cf. Golden v. A.P. Orleans, 681 F. Supp. 1100, 1104 (E.D. l'a. 1988) (after consid-
ering conirt4 factor, court concluded that plaintiff's contract with defendant resulted in "her
absolute dependence" upon defendant for her livelihood, thus finding employee status); Nanavati
v. Burdette Tomlin fvfent'l Hosp., No. 83-0794, 83-1790, 1986 WL 15318, at *3 (D,NJ, June 23,
1986) (although finding that physician was not employee of hospital, court recognized physician
had some degree of econontic dependence upon hospital).
66 950 F.2d at 377.
(17 Id. at 380.
68 Id. al 379.
69 Id. at 381.
7" See id. at 379.
71
 Knight, 950 F.2d al 381. The final irony of Knight is that it claimed to apply an economic
realities test when actually it adopted the hybrid test. See id. at 378.
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it, too, demonstrates the predominance of the right-to-control factor. 72
The plaintiff was a district manager who served as a distributor of
Zippo products to wholesalers and retailers. 73 The court found that
Zippo exercised "virtually no control" over the district managers. 74 The
managers were free to set. their own hours, operate "under the business
form of their choice," and hire employees.'' Although the managers
were furnished with Zippo stationery and business forms, they supplied
their own office equipment and furnishings. 7" The court concluded:
[E]ven if appellants were required to sell only Zippo prod-
ucts, and even if they were economically dependent on the
income they earned as Zippo [district managers], these fac-
tors are not sufficient to establish that they were employees
when balanced against the other factors that tend to establish
their status as independent con tractors. 77
The zippo decision clarifies the true meaning of the hybrid test.
Although in everyday parlance "hybrid" connotes the combining of
two relatively equal parts, 78 as applied in zippo, the factor of right to
control largely overcomes any real consideration of economic depend-
ence.
4. Common-Law Test, Round II
The popularity of the hybrid approach notwithstanding, it now
appears that we have come full circle with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Nationwide Mutual Insurance Go. v. Darden, which has triggered
a return to the common-law test. 7" Al issue in Darden was the definition
of "employee" under ERISA. 8° Ultimately, the Court adopted for ERISA
a common-law test that it had previously summarized in another case.'"
The Court identified thirteen factors that should be considered in
determining a worker's status:
72 713 17.2d at 38.
73 SPe id. al 33.
7 ' 1 Id.
SeI! id.
76 SIT M. at 33-34.
77 Zip," 713 F.2d at 38.
71'See WEasTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 657 (Robert B. Costello ed., 1991) (defining
"hybrid" as "anything derived from unlike sources, or composed of disparate or incongruous
elements: composite").
79
 See 503 U.S. 318 (1992):
8(' Id. at 319. ER1SA defines "employee" as 'any individual employed by an employer." Id. at
321 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1002(6)).
81 Id. at 323.
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(1) the hiring party's right to control the manner and
means by which the product is accomplished;
(2) the skill required;
(3) the source of the instrumentalities and tools;
(4) the location of the work;
(5) the duration of the relationship between the parties;
(6) whether the hiring party has the right to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party;
(7) the extent of the hired party's discretion over when and
how long to work;
(8) the method of payment;
(9) the hired party's role in hiring and paying assistants;
(10) whether the work is part of the regular business of the
hi ring party;
(11) whether the hiring party is in business;
(12) the provision of employee benefits; and
(13) the tax treatment of the hired party. 82
The Darden decision has significantly influenced judicial interpre-
tations under Title VII and ADEA." Many recent decisions have inter-
preted Darden as requiring application of the common-law test to Title
VII and ADEA claims, even if the courts had previously applied either
the economic realities or hybrid test.'" In some cases, the application
of the resurgent com ► on-law test has yielded results similar to the
hybrid test, 85 while within at least one federal circuit, there has been
an apparent backlash to the imposition of the common-law test. 86
82 hi. at 323-24 (citing Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989)).
8:1 See, e.g., Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 90 (2i1 Cir. 1993); Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission v. Catholic. Knights Ins. Soc'y, 915 E. Stipp. 25, 27-28 (N.D. III. 1996); Lattanzi()
v. Security Nat'l Bank, 825 F. Stipp. 86, 88-89 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
61 See, e.g., Frankel, 987 17.2d at 90; Catholic Knights, 915 F. Supp. at 27-28 (N.D. III. 1090);
Kellam v. Snelling Personnel Serv., 866 E Stipp. 812, 814 (D, Del. 1994), afro!, 65 F.Od 162 (3d
Cir. 1995); Lattanzi(), 825 F. Stipp. at 88-89; see also Wilde v. County of Kandiyulti, 15 F.3d 103,
105-06 (8th Cir. 1994) (ffivoring common-law test in light. of Darden but tingling that because
COMIllim-law and hybrid tests are so similar, district court did not commit reversible error by
applying latter).
" See Alexander v. Rush North Shore Med. Cu'., 101 F.3d 487, 492-94 (7th Cir. 1996)
(physician with staff privileges at hospital is independent contractor); Catholic Knights, 915 F.
Supp. at 31 (insurance agent not employee); Kellam, 860 F. Stipp. at 815-16 (temporary workers
assigned by employment agency not employees of agency),
86
 See Frankel, 987 F.2d at 90-91 (summary judgment denied where issue of material fact
remains as to whether sales representative was employee); McFadden-Peel v. Staten Island Cable,
873 E Stipp. 757, 760-62 (E.D.N.V. 1994) (summary judgment denied where court concluded
that cable television achninistrataif was employee, not independent contractor); Jones v. Mega
Fitness, No. 94 C1V. 8393, 1096 Wt. 267941, at *5-0 (S,D,N.Y. May 21, 1990) ("obligated" to apply
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5. Conclusions
Despite the putative differences among the common-law, hybrid
and economic realities tests, there appears to be only minor distinc-
tions among them at the point of application by the courts. Most sig-
nificantly, the discussion above demonstrates that, regardless of which
standard is applied, consideration of economic dependence is secon-
dary, at best, to the question of right to control.
In fact, many courts have acknowledged that the distinctions be-
tween the tests tend to be minimal. In Wilson v. United Farm Bureau
Insurance Co., the district court observed that under "either a pure
`economic realities test' or a 'hybrid' test between the economic reali-
ties test and a 'right to control' test, the factors the courts consider
have been substantially similar." 87 In Frankel v. Bally, Inc., the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that "in practice
there is little discernible difference between the hybrid test and the
common law agency 'test," as both primarily emphasize "the hiring
party's right to control the manner and means by which the work is
accomplished."88
 Taken together, these judicial statements lead to a
neat. syllogism showing that the tests are largely the same.
Such a facile way of making a substantive point compels further
explanation. Certainly the economic realities test offers a potentially
stronger analytical framework for finding that individuals are employ-
ees rather than independent contractors in that some factors in the
Darden common-law test that often favor classification as an indepen-
dent contractor, especially "the provision of employee benefits" and
"the tax treatment of the hired party," are not explicit factors under
popular formulations of the economic realities test. 8"
However, it is not altogether clear that some of the plaintiffs who
have been caught in the adoption of the Darden common-law test
would have fared any better under the economic realities test. For
example, consider the Wilson case.•"' Plaintiff Phyllis Wilson was an
insurance agent for defendant Farm Bureau who, upon her termina-
tion, filed suit alleging discrimination under both Title VII and the
ADEA.' 1
common-law test, court finds that trier of fact could conclude that fitness instructor was em-
ployee).
Nu.
	 93-1460-C I.1/C, 1995 WL 378521, at *4 (S.D. Ind. June 15, 1995).
"987 F.2d at 90; accord Lambertsert, 79 F.3d at 1028; Wilde, 15 KM at 106.
89 See Darden, 503 U.S. at 323-24.
91) 1995 WL 378521, at I.




Farm Bureau had provided Wilson with an office and supplies,
secretarial services, and Farm Bureau materials and applications. 92
Farm Bureau offered to lease computers to its agents, and Wilson did
so." In terms of compensation, Wilson was paid by commission and
received no health benefits.'" Farm Bureau treated her as an inde-
pendent contractor for standard payroll deductions:A Wilson was "free
to develop clients outside of her territory as long as the clients were
not already represented by a Farm Bureau agent.'''Wit'
In deciding summary judgment motions brought by both parties
on the independent contract issue, the district court applied the Dar-
den test and concluded that "some of the factors suggest Wilson was
an employee, some suggest she was an independent contractor, and
some are neutral."' The court denied both motions, finding that
reasonable triers of fact could differ on the question of whether Wilson
was an independent contractor or an employee."
Ideally, the economic realities test would provide a clearer resolu-
tion of this issue, hopefully—at least for those who favor more expan-
sive coverage for discrimination law—in Wilson's favor. Nevertheless,
Wilson's status under the economic realities test carries the same
uncertainty. To use the Dunlop Commission's formulation, it is diffi-
cult to argue that Wilson was a "truly independent entrepreneur."99
However, Wilson did not fit into the classic category of a misclassified
worker, for she was a skilled, specially-trained worker who was earning,
presumably, better than subsistence wages as an insurance agent. 1tl "
In addition, had Wilson developed her own clientele outside of
the Farm Bureau region, this would have further cut against employee
status under the economic realities test.'" 1 Wilson surely did better
under the economic realities test than she did under the Darden com-
mon-law test,'"2 but it is not clear that she would have prevailed on her
summary judgment motion had the former standard been applied.
92




9' SIT	 1995 WL 378521, at *3. Interestingly, the Internal Revenue Service considered
her an employee or the company in determining her tax status. See id.
ye Id.
97 Id. at *9.
98 M. at *11.
99 Sre DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, .Su/Ea• note 4, at 38.
lw See Wilson, 1995 WI. 378521, at *3.
101 See id.
Wilson's situation bears similarities to that of the plaintiff in Lilley, in which the court
(Mind that employee status existed. CI Lilley, 958 F,2d at 750,
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With the wider adoption of the common-law standard, we can
fairly conclude that only individuals who fit into traditional patterns of
employment. will be sure bets to fall within the statutory definition of
employee. This leaves .
 everyone else in a potential regulatory void.
Specialized professionals such as doctors who work at more than one
hospital, salespersons such as teal estate brokers and insurance agents,
and service workers such as those who own or work for catering
businesses and cleaning services are among the individuals who in
most cases will not be able to meet the requirements of the right-to-
control test. The unfortunate direction being taken by the federal
judiciary in this regard comes at a time when those who are likely to
be excluded from discrimination laws' protection constitute a growing
sector of the workforce.i°
B. 42 U.S.C. Section 1981
Enacted in the post-Civil War Reconstruction era, 42 U.S.C. § 1981
("Section 1981") offers protections to any individual who is discrimi-
nated against on the basis of race or ethnicity.m As such, individuals
who could be classified as independent contractors under federal em-
ployment discrimination laws have sometimes sought relief under this
statute.m5 In evaluating the substance of employment-related Section
1981 claims, courts have generally applied the same standards as ap-
plied to Title VII cases.m
Section 1981 offers plaintiffs several potential advantages over
Title VII and its progeny. Unlike the employment discrimination stat-
utes, there is no jurisdictional minimum concerning the number of
employees an employer must have in order to maintain the lawsuit.' 07
In addition, the statute of limitations in a Section 1981 case is the same
"See Nu pro notes 27-44 and accompanying text.
10.1 42 U.S.C. § 1981. The statute stales, inter alia:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in
every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give
evidence, and to die full and my al benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject
to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind,
and to no other.
Id.
"See, e.g., Bration v. Roadway Package Sys., Inc., 77 F.3d 168, 171 (7th Cir. 1996); Fitzgerald
v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 68 E3d 1257, 1260 (10th Gil -. 1995); Gomez v. Alexian Bros.
Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1983),
100 5re Bration, 77 E3d at 176; Gomez, 698 F.2d at 1022; Wright v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Go., 911 E Stipp, 1364, 1376 (1). Kan. 1995).
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (a).
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as under an appropriate state statute," which will usually be longer
than the 180 day or 300 day time limitation under Title VII." Finally,
unlike Title VII, Section 1981 imposes no cap on compensatory and
punitive damages.' 1 "
However, there are a number of significant factors that preclude
the use of Section 1981 as a potential alternative remedy for those who
may be deemed independent contractors. The foremost limitation is
the scope of the statute itself in that it prohibits discrimination only
on the basis of race or ethnicity, thus excluding claims based upon
other grounds, most notably sex.'''
Secondly, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in General
Building Contractors Ass'n. v. Pennsylvania, Section 1981 requires proof
of discriminatory motivation, thus barring lawsuits based upon sys-
temic disparate impact." 2 General Building Contractors Ass'n involved a
group of black plaintiffs who were seeking work in the construction
industry."" Their complaint alleged racial discrimination "in the op-
eration of an exclusive hiring hall" in contracts between a local union
and area construction employers, as well as in an apprenticeship pro-
gram set up by the union and several construction trade associations."'
One issue in this case was "whether liability may be imposed under
[Section] 1981 without proof of intentional discrimination.""5 The
Court analyzed the legislative history and concluded that Section 1981
"can be violated only by purposeful discrimination." Section 1981
originated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and its primary purpose was
to "protect a limited category of rights, specifically defined in terms of
racial equality." 17 Congressional debates show that the Black Codes—
statutes enacted by Southern states to limit the rights of freed blacks-
108
 Set! Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc„ 421 U.S. 454, 462 (1975).
1(5 See 42 U.S,C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994).
110 Sel! 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b); Williams v. To ins-World Airlines, Inc., 507 F. Stipp. 293, 304-05
(Mo. 1980), aff'd in part, reu'd in part on other goounds, 660 F.2d 1267, 1275 (8th Cir. 1981).
in See Sherlock v. Montefiore Med. Cu'., 84 E3d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1996) (affirming dismissal
of Section 1981 claim on ground that plaintiff "did not allege that she was a member of a racial
or ethnic minority"); Fielenkamp v. Kingsley Ass'n, 682 F. Stipp. 813, 815 (W.1). Pa, 1987)
(granting summary judgment because "claims cd sex discrimination are not cognizable" muter
Section 1981); we also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 167 (1976) (reasoning that section 1983
applies only to racial or ethnic discrimination)
112 See 458 U.S. 375, 388, 390-91 (1982).
' 13 See id. at 378.
"'See id. at 378-79.
11 ." Id. at 383.
116 M. at 391.
of this statute, see McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
117 General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S.
Tran.sp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 287-96 (1976),
at 384. For an extensive discussion of the history
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were of chief concern to supporters of the civil rights legislation."' At
the time, Congress "acted to protect the freedmen from intentional
discrimination.""' It was not concerned with facially neutral practices
"that. had the incidental effect of disadvantaging blacks to a greater
degree than whites." 120
Third, Section 1981 provides only a private right of action, which
means that potential claimants cannot seek relief by filing a complaint
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). 121
This is a significant obstacle for those who can neither afford private
counsel nor qualify for legal services representation. Fourth, Section
1981 cannot be invoked against state employers. 122 In Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District, the Supreme Court held that Section 1981
may be not used as the basis of a discrimination suit against the state.'
Finally, although it appears clear-cut that there is no requirement
that the plaintiff in a Section 1981 suit be an "employee,"' 2' at least
one federal district court chose to impose such a requirement in
dismissing a plaintiffs Section 1981 claim.' 25 In that case, the court
held that the "plaintiff is not an 'employee' as that term is applied
pursuant to Section 1981, and therefore, that plaintiff cannot assert a
Section 1981 claim." 126
In sum, the limitations on the use of Section 1981 pose a particu-
larly difficult obstacle to independent contractors who may have no
avenue of relief under Title VII, the ADEA or the ADA. Although
Section 1981 offers possible relief to independent contractors who
118
 See General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, 458 U.S. at 386-87.
IP' Id. at 388. Senator Trumbull, who introduced the legislation, stated:
Since the abolition of slavery, the Legislatures witieh have assembled in the insur-
rectionary States have passed laws relating to the freedmen, and in nearly all the
States they have discriminated against them. They deny them certain rights, subject
thou to severe penalties, and still impose upon them the very restrictions which
were imposed upon them in consequence of the existence of slavery, and before it
was abolished. The purpose of the bill under considerations is to destroy all these
discriminations, and to carry into effect the [Thirteenth] amendment.
Id. at 387 (quoting Corsi:. GLonii, 39th Cong. 474 (1806)).
t=' 11 Id. at 388 (referring to disparate impact test in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
430 (1971)).
121 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a) (1994) (establishing ETLOC jurisdiction in Title VII disputes).
I 22 Sce Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 735 (1989).
123 Id. (holding that section 1983 "provides the exclusive federal damages remedy 6 ir the
violation of rights guaranteed by § 1981 when the claim is pressed against a state actor").
12 ' 1 .5ef nVanaludi, 1986 WI. 15318 at *3
	 requirement that one be an "employee" to recover
under Section 1981).
125
 RoSCOC v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 1988 WI, 88-Ar-0882-S, 214511, at *2 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 8.
1988).
126 Id. The court cited no authority fin - that claim. See id.
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have been subjected to intentional discrimination on the basis of race
or ethnicity, it excludes from coverage all other claims that are available
to employees under the employment discrimination laws.
III. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM FROM LABOR, BUSINESS, AND ACADEME
The growing recognition that many workers are excluded from
the protections of federal labor and employment laws has led to a
number of proposals for reform, usually via proposed statutory amend-
ments. The following is a summary and analysis of recent proposals
relating to which individuals may be covered under employment dis-
crimination law.
A. Economic Realities Test
The economic realities test is the reform of choice among those
who are calling for discrimination laws to cover a wider range of
workers. For example, the Dunlop Commission recommended that
Congress adopt the economic realities test "and apply it across the
board in employment and labor law."' 27 It further explained that:
Workers should be treated as independent contractors if
they are truly independent entrepreneurs performing serv-
ices for clients—i.e., if they present themselves to the general
public as an established business presence, have a number of
clients, bear the economic risk of loss from their work, and
the like.
Workers who are economically dependent on the entity for
whom they perform services generally should be treated as
employees. Factors such as low wages, low skill levels, and
having one or few employers should all militate against treat-
ment as an independent contractor.' 28
Such an approach, the ComMission opined, would remove incen-
tives to evade federal labor and employment laws.' 29 In particular,
the traditional common-law test applied by some courts for deter-
mining who is an employee "yields inconsistent results" and "pro-
127
 DUNLOP COMMISSION REPORT, SUPra note 4, at 38. In this section of its report, the
Commission examined the application of the National Labor Relations Act, Title VII, the ELSA
and ERISA. Id. at 37.
128 id. at 38.
129 1d. at 39.
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vides employers and workers with a means and incentive to circum-
vent the employment policies of the nation." 13°
The economic realities test has gained adherents within labor,
business and academe. For example, AFL-CIO General Counsel
Jonathan Hiatt, NCEP chairperson Carnevale, and Professor Nancy
Dowd have all favored its adoption.' 3 '
Despite its popularity among advocates for reform, the economic
realities test has many drawbacks even where, in contrast to how courts
have interpreted the test, it is applied in a pure form that stresses
economic dependence. First, the economic realities test may, if ap-
plied properly, lead to the classification of a party as an "employee" in
a way that tramples over any common understanding of the term.'" To
illustrate this point, suppose an all-female construction firm attempts
to win a contract with the primary employer in what might be called
a company town. The employer rejects the bid on the basis of sex.
Under the economic realities test, it is quite possible that the construc-
tion firm and its employees are "economically dependent" upon the
town's one major employer for business and income. However, no
one would consider the independent contractor or its workers to be
prospective "employees" of the major employer in the usual sense of
the term.
There is a risk of long-term damage to the integrity of the law if
we start playing too much with the definitions of concepts that have
deep roots in American common law, and both "employee" and "inde-
pendent contractor" fall into this category.'" Historically, they are
different, albeit related, species.' 34
 if addressing the policy concerns
surrounding independent contractors and discrimination law required
redefining "employee," then perhaps the traditional definition should
yield. However, as we suggest below, that is neither necessary nor the
best approach.'
Secondly, even the economic realities test excludes a large number
of independent contractors who should, as a policy matter, be pro-
tected under discrimination law. Underlying the economic realities test
13° Id. at 38.
' s ' Dowd, supra note 6, at 112-14; Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy issues Concerning the Contingent
Work Force, 52 WASII. & LIE• L. REv. 739,749-50 (1995); Carnevale, supra note 4, at 5.
132
 For a discussion of statutory constructions of the term "employee," see supra notes 47-86
and accompanying text.
1 "The historical evolution of the distinction between employees and independent contrac-
tors is explored in Perrin, supra note 14, at 999-1011 and Dowd, supra note 6, at 96-1412,
134 See supra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
135
 See infra notes 160-162 and accompanying text.
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is a desire to separate "real" independent contractors from those who
should be deemed employees.' 36 The Dunlop Commission articulated
this common distinction:
When one thinks of an independent contractor, one normally
thinks of one firm hiring a second firm—with its own staff,
equipment, and resources—to do certain work, instead of
having its own employees do it. The problems arise when the
first firm hires not another firm but a single or several indi-
viduals to do work, and then wishes to treat those individuals
as independent contractors rather than as employees.'"
The problem with this distinction when applied to discrimination
law is that the rationale that supports protecting an individual is equally
applicable to a firm. For example, let us return to the illustration
above, where one firm declines to offer a contract to a second firm
because the second firm is made up of all women. If the broader
purpose of employment discrimination law is to protect all workers
from discrimination on the basis of certain protected categories, then
Title VII should be an available remedy for that second firm. However,
even under the economic realities test, that all-female firm would likely
he precluded from seeking relief under Title VII.'"8 If the first firm
denied an individual woman employment on the basis of sex, she
probably would have little difficulty meeting the economic realities test.
There is no reason to support such a distinction.
Thirdly, the notion of "economic dependence" by definition may
make it difficult or even impossible for some independent contractors
to gain standing to sue. For example, suppose an individual owns an
elevator repair and maintenance business and has five primary custom-
ers, each representing about equal shares of the individual's gross in-
come. One of these customers ceases to do business with him, allegedly
because of his race. Because this customer represents "only" twenty
percent of his business, a trier of fact would not necessarily conclude
that the individual was economically dependent on that one customer,
despite that most people would deem a twenty percent loss of income
to be significant.
Finally, statutory adoption of the economic realities test probably
would not reduce the amount of litigation deciding who is an em-
i311 DUNLOP COMMISSION RKPORT, supra.note 4, at 37.
197
13m For a discussion or the economic realities test, see supra notes 53-62 and accompanying
text.
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ployee; it would simply mean that economic dependence is one factor
that courts weigh in determining employee status. Plaintiffs and defen-
dants would continue to battle over this issue, thus prolonging the
delay in reaching the merits of discrimination claims.'"
In sum, the economic realities test is an improvement on the
common-law test, but it does not go far enough in recognizing the
structural changes in the American workforce and protecting the grow-
ing number of workers who do not fall into older, more traditional
patterns of employment. Its adoption would result in still too many
workers being denied the protections of federal discrimination law.
B. Perritt Approach
A different approach has been suggested by Professor Henry Per-
ritt, a former Deputy Under Secretary of Labor.'" After examining the
legal status of independent contractors under a full range of federal
labor and employment laws, Perritt recommended that "antidiscrimi-
nation statutes should define employee so as to include any inde-
pendent contractor that does not have employees of its own. "141
In terms of extending protections to independent contractors,
Professor Perritt's approach offers some clear advantages. Like the
economic realities test, it offers protection to the kind of worker who
is most likely to be misclassified by an employer as an independent
contractor, namely, an individual who has no employees and very little
economic bargaining power. 142
 Furthermore, unlike the economic re-
alities test, it does so in a clean, neat manner that is less likely to result
in costly and time-consuming litigation.'"
However, as we urge above, there is no reason to exclude inde-
pendent contractors who have employees from coverage under Title
VII and other discrimination laws."4
 In this sense, we think Professor
Perritt should have cast a wider net. For example, returning to an
example posed above, if a company refuses to award a contract to a
Cf. Edward A. Lenz, Contingent Work
—Dispelling the Myth, 52 WAsn. & Lee L. Rev. 755,
757 (1995). Lenz, Senior Vice President of the National Association of Temporary and Staffing
Services and flamer Assistant General Counsel to Kelly Services, objected to the use of the
economic realities test on grounds that "any test based on subjective factors will be problematic
from an enforcement standpoint." Id.
I'm See Perrin, supra note 14, at 989.
I'll Id. at 1039.
"2 See id.
"3 See id.
See text accompanying supra notes 137-38.
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construction firm because the firm is staffed solely by women, then the
broader purposes of discrimination law certainly apply here as well.
Secondly, one can imagine a single independent contractor who
truly does not meet anyone's conception of "employee." This recalls
another point made above, namely, that we should avoid recasting
terms that consistently have been defined another way.'"
C. Metzenbaum Bill
In 1994, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, a Democrat from Ohio,
introduced The Contingent Workforce Equity Act, which proposed a
number of statutory amendments designed to provide a greater array
of legal rights and protections to contingent workers, including inde-
pendent contractors. 146 In terms of employment discrimination, the bill
proposed an amendment to Section 1981 that would protect "[a]li
persons within the jurisdiction of the United States" from unlawful
discrimination. 147 In determining what constitutes unlawful discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age or
disability, the bill applied "the same legal standards . . . as are applica-
ble" under Title VU, the ADEA and the ADA."'
Although the proposed amendments to Section 1981 do not spe-
cifically refer to independent contractors, it is clear from Senator
Metzenbaum's remarks on the Senate floor that they are intended to
protect from discrimination all contingent workers who are otherwise
excluded under current statutory definitions. 14• However, the exact way
in which the "new" Section 1981 would interact with specific employ-
ment discrimination laws is uncertain.
145 See supra notes 133-35 and accompanying text.
1413 140 CONG. REC. 514,242-43, 514,247 (1994).
147 1d. at 514,248.
45 1d.
"9 See id. at S14,247. Sen. Metzenbaum stated:
This comprehensive legislation ensures that contingent workers—who now account
for over a quarter of the work force—have the same rights and protections under
our Federal labor laws as full-time workers. In short, their work may be contingent,
but their rights shouldn't he.
A broad patchwork of Federal labor laws provides American workers with a safety
net of minimum protections. These protections extend to wages, benefits, working
conditions, equal employment opportunity, and other aspects of the employment
relationship. But Congress wrote these laws with full-time workers in mind, and
millions of contingent workers are slipping through the safety net.
Id. Metzenbaum went on to describe several federal court decisions that illustrated how contin-
gent workers were excluded from statutory coverage, including Knight v. United Farm Bureau
Mutual Ins. Co., 950 F.2d 377 (7th Cir. 1991). Id.
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Perhaps the most significant unresolved issue under the Metzen-
baum bill is whether the Supreme Court's holding in General Building
Contractors Ass'n that a Section 1981 claim requires discriminatory
motivation would apply to independent contractors who seek relief on
the grounds provided by Title VII, the ADEA and the ADA. 15(1 The
proposed bill does not explicitly overrule General Building Contractors
Ass'n,''' nor did its sponsor say anything that would contradict previous
interpretations of Section 1981's legislative history, yet it incorporates
statutes that permit lawsuits based solely upon disparate impact and
states that the "same legal standards shall apply as are applicable"
under those statutes. 152 If a similar bill should become law, this ambi-
guity would likely have to be resolved by the courts.
D. Standing Pat
Naturally, another option is to do nothing on the legislative level
and continue to defer to the courts on the independent contractor
question. Under this scenario, it is likely that the Darden common-law
test will continue to steadily eradicate the economic realities and hy-
brid tests in discrimination claims. 153
Some commentators have urged caution in expanding the cover-
age of labor and employment laws to independent contractors and
others frequently placed in the contingent workforce. For example,
Professor Samuel Estreicher, in a critique of the Dunlop Commission's
recommendations for the contingent workforce, warned against using
the generic label of "contingent workers" to address a host of varying
concerns, noting that problems such as access to health insurance
coverage, misclassification as independent contractors, home work ar-
rangements and outsourcing of jobs "should be analyzed separately
rather than grouped together." 154
150 See 458 U.S. 375, 388 (1982). This case is discussed supra notes 112-20.
151 Compare this to the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 2(2), 105 Stat. 1071,
in which there is an explicit legislative response to the Supreme Court's decision in Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Monk 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
152 See 140 CONG. REG. 514,248 (1994) (proposed amendment to Section 1981 includes
applying Title VII standards to Section 1981 claims). Title VII expressly recognizes causes of action
based upon disparate impact..42 U.S.C. § 2000c-2(k- ) (1) (A) (1994). Note, however, that some
courts have held that systemic disparate impact claims may not be raised under the ADEA. See
Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1006-07 (10th Cir. 1996) ; ef. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,
113 S. Ct. 1701 (1993) (reasoning that although status of "disparate impact" is questionable as
to ADEA, theory of "disparate treatment" applies under statute).
153 See generally 503 U.S. 318 (1992); see also supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
154 Samuel Estreicher, The Dunlop Report and the Future of Labor Law Refinit, 12 LAB. LAW.
117, 131 (1996); see Maria O'Brien Hylton, The Case Against Regulating the Market for Contingent
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It is not the purpose of this Article to engage in a wide-ranging
debate over the legal rights and economic status of independent con-
tractors and contingent workers. Our point is that the generalized
arguments against regulation do not apply with the same force, if at
all, to discrimination law. For example, Professor Perritt distinguished
between discrimination laws and other statutes such as the Fair Labor
Standards Act that more directly affect labor market competition:
The antidiscrimination statutes have no particular concern
with labor market competitive forces. Nor is there any appar-
ent reason why they are concerned with control over work-
place conditions. Rather, the central policy reflected by Title
VII, along with the other titles of the civil rights acts, and the
reconstruction era civil rights acts, is that persons ought riot
to discriminate in the their economic relations based upon
certain prohibited characteristics.' 55
Perritt urged that the definition of employee under Title VII should
be "extended broadly to include a large spectrum of independent
contractor relations," even if such coverage "includes many inde-
pendent contractors who ought to be excluded from NLRA or safety
and health regulation." 156
Furthermore, it makes no difference if borrowing from Professor
Hylton's claims about the legal problems of contingent workers gener-
ally, there currently is no evidence that independent contractors are
in "dire need of help" in fighting discrimination. 157 What is known is
that the application of the common-law, hybrid and pure economic
realities tests has resulted in many workers not afforded coverage by
federal discrimination laws. 158 Furthermore, this sector of the work-
force is large and apparently growing.''" Absent statistical data to the
contrary, it is fair to assume that independent contractors are subjected
Empiortott, 52 WAsii. & LEE L. REA,. 849, 850 (1995) (fiivoring restraint "based on the absence
of evidence to support the existence of a serious problem unique to the contingent. work ftwee");
Stewart Schwab, The Diversity of Contingeta Workers and the Need jiff Nuanced Policy, 52 WASI I. &
LEE L REv. 915, 910 (1995) (observing that %jobs labelled contingent arc extremely diverse,"
nece.ssitating policy responses that are "cautious and nuanced.").
Perrin, .utpra note 14, at 1039.
1511 Id. Compare Schwab, supra note 154, at 922 (suggesting that although contingent workers
should be protected under Title VII, "a law mandating equal hourly pay for part-time or hill-time
work ... cannot be justified on social insurance grounds, nor does it apply general minimum
standards to contingent workers, nor does it monitor who should get a job").
I" Cf: Hylton, supra note 154, at 849-50.
158 See supra notes 87-109 and accompanying text,
I59 See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text.
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to discrimination at a rate at least congruent with that of traditional
employees.
IV. A BETTER OPTION
The most effective way to protect independent contractors and,
where applicable, their employees from unlawful discrimination is to
directly amend the appropriate discrimination statutes to expressly
cover them. In doing so, independent contractors would take their
place alongside traditional employees as a separate protected classifica-
tion, and they would be entitled to raise the full range of discrimina-
tion theories that are currently available to employees. 16"
This approach offers a number of significant advantages over the
proposals for reform analyzed above. Most importantly, it offers legal
protections and remedies against discrimination to the largest possible
number of workers. It does so without twisting out of shape commonly
accepted understandings of the terms "employee" and "independent
contractor." Furthermore, it removes any incentive for an employer to
classify workers as independent contractors to evade discrimination
laws and to use the possibility of litigation over this issue as leverage in
pre-trial negotiations. 16 ' In addition, it promises to reduce the amount
of litigation over the determination of employee status. Finally, by
limiting itself to discrimination law and thereby avoiding interference
with other labor and employment laws, it takes the "nuanced ap-
proach" recommended by those who have suggested treading carefully,
if at all, into regulatory expansion.' 62
What on its face seems to be a rather simple proposal does, in fact,
raise a number of issues. Discussed below are four issues that we believe
are the most significant:
I0 Direct amendments to the employment discrimination sumacs will ensure that inde-
pendent contractors can raise disparate impact claims as well as disparate treatment claims, thus
re:miming some of the ambiguities created by a general "tack-on" amendment to Section 1981 as
provided in the Metzenbaum bill, discussed in supra notes 146-52 and accompanying text.
16i
 For example, in 1982, the American Management Association fired a group of sales
representatives and rehired some of them as independent contractors. See Ansberry, supra note
35, at Al. Several years later, it terminated a group of these independent contractors who were
over 50 years of age. including one of its top salespersons. See id. The individuals filed an age
discrimination suit, and the company argued that because the plaintiff's were independent con-
tractors, the law did not apply. See id. The case was settled out of court. See id.
152 See generally Hylton, supra note 154; Schwab, supra note 154; discussion accompanying
supra notes 155-58.
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A. Types of Independent Contractors and Their Employees
This proposal offers blanket coverage to independent contrac-
tors and their employees. Independent contractors, as well as employ-
ees of independent contractors, should have a right of action. We
see no reason to distinguish between a single independent contrac-
tor and an independent contractor with employees of its own, a con-
clusion that may be at odds with adherents of the economic reali-
ties test. In criticizing the common-law test, Professor Dowd stated
that it
fails to distinguish between an individual who essentially con-
tracts with the employer from a relatively equal bargaining
position and the worker who is involved in an ongoing rela-
tionship in which significant direct or indirect control is re-
tained by the employer. In the latter relationship, bargaining
power with respect to the terms and conditions of employ-
ment rests almost entirely with the employer. 163
Under Professor Dowd's analysis and the economic realities test
generally, the individual worker who, for all intents and purposes,
is treated like an employee by the employer except for purposes of
determining statutory rights should be protected under federal
law.'" The independent contractor with employees of its own that
contracts to do work from a more equal bargaining position pre-
sumably would not be covered. 1 "5
Although unequal bargaining power certainly is a reason for statu-
tory and judicial intervention, the distinction is unwarranted when ap-
plied to discrimination. Under either scenario above, the effect of dis-
crimination would be largely the same in that an employer has erected
"arbitrary, unnecessary barriers to employment opportunities."'" The
deterrent and remedial goals of discrimination law would be best
achieved by eliminating needless distinctions between types of inde-
pendent contractors and by allowing their employees to pursue relief
independently.
Of course, an unqualified definition of independent contractor
raises the possibility of overbreadth. For example, what should happen
when an individual client dismisses a 500-person law firm, allegedly on
165 Dowd, supra note 6, at 85.
164 See id. at 85-86.
165 See id. at 85.
I"' See id. at 114.
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grounds of anti-Semitism?'"' Under this proposal, there would be no
legal bar preventing the law firm from suing the individual, thus
arguably opening the door to wasteful litigation and a clash between
the broad objective of discouraging discriminatory behavior and the
fundamental right to choose one's attorney.
While such a scenario is possible, it is unlikely. A large, powerful
institution would hesitate mightily before filing a discrimination suit
against a single client. Given the negative perception of lawyers in the
eyes of the general public, the potential for unflattering publicity
would be great even if the law firm had an airtight case. Even taking
this out of a law firm context, the potential expenses of both time and
money would cause most businesses to reject commencing such a
lawsuit on purely cost-benefit grounds.
Two approaches toward legislatively addressing this concern
would be to institute either a fixed ceiling or ratio or a factor test that
would weigh economic power relationships between the parties. For
example, a fixed ceiling could disqualify as a plaintiff any independent
contractor that has more than, say, twenty workers; a ratio approach
might disqualify any independent contractor with more workers than
the defendant. Considerations of economic power relationships could
compare payrolls, budgets and earnings in a way that would disqualify
any plaintiff with greater resources than the defendant.
Both approaches are problematic. A fixed ceiling or ratio compar-
ing the plaintiff to the defendant would be subjectively determined
and likely result in unfairness at the margins. Any kind of factor test
incorporating the economic power relationship between the parties
would lead to the same types of ambiguities raised by the common-law,
economic realities and hybrid tests. In essence, because our proposal
is grounded in the principle that discrimination against either tradi-
tional employees or independent contractors is wrong, we would prefer
a wait-and-see approach to assess whether large institutions would use
this standard as a hammer to retain individuals and small independent
contractors.
Finally, although the question of whether an employee of an
independent contractor should be permitted to sue a company that
has retained the services of that contractor is explored more fully in
the section on temporary help agencies below, it generally should be
answered in the affirmative. This would obviate the potential injustice
presented in a case like Thomason v. Prudential Insurance Co. of Amer-
ica, in which Martha Thomason, the administrative assistant of a Pru-
1f7 This question was posed by Professor St. Antoine. Letter from Theodore J. St. Antoine to
David Yamada (July 3, 1996) (on lile with co-author David Yamada).
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dential insurance agent, alleged that her supervisor sexually harassed
her and made disparaging remarks about her religion.' 1 i8
 The United
States District Court for the District of Kansas reasoned that because
the insurance agent was not an employee of Prudential but rather an
independent contractor, Thomason did not have standing to sue Pru-
dential under Title VII.' 69
B. Counting "Employees" 'Towards Statutory Minimums
The creation of a separate classification for independent contrac-
tors implicates the definition of "employer" under the relevant statutes.
Title VII defines an employer as "a person engaging in an industry
affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees for each work-
ing clay in each of twenty or more calendar weeks in the current or
preceding calendar year,""" and the ADEA and ADA contain similar
defining language."'
The issue of whether independent contractors may count towards
the statutory minimum is important to independent contractors and
traditional employees alike. In confronting questions of whether inde-
pendent contractors and other parties who are not traditional employ-
ees may be counted, courts have used the same tests that are used to
determine whether a potential plaintiff has standing to sue."' In an
interesting irony, permanent employees have been denied standing to
sue because the courts have declined to count independent contrac-
tors and other individuals towards the minimum number of employees
necessary to bring the employees under the scope of the statutes.'"
In Walters v. Metropolitan Educational Enterprises, Inc., the Supreme
Court clarified that the so-called "payroll method" should be used to
count the number of employees to meet the jurisdictional minimum."'
168 See 866 F. Supp. 1329, 1330 (I). Kan. 1994).
1119 Id. at 1334-36.
170 Title VII, § 701(b), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994).
171 The ADEA, in contrast to Title V11, requires 20 employees. 29 U.S.C. 630(b) (1994).
The ADA originally required 25 employees; as of July 1994, 15 is now the statutory minimum.
42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (1994).
See Greenlees v Eidenmuller Enter., Inc., 32 F.3d 197, 198-99 (5111 Cir. 1994) (interpret-
ing term "employment agency"); Goudeau v. Dental Health Se.rv„ Inc., 901 F. Supp. 1139, 1142
(M.D. La. 1995) (applying hybrid test); Kellam v. Snelling Personnel Scrv., 866 E Stipp. 812,
814-15 (I). Del. 1994) (applying common-law test); Latranzio v. Security Nat'l Rank, 825 F. Supp.
86, 89 (E,D. Pa, 1993) (applying common-law test),
175 See, e.g., Kellam, 866 F. Supp. at 814-16 (permanent employee of employment agency
could not sue because temporary workers hired by agency were not "employees" under statute);
Lattanzi°, 825 V Supp. at 89-91 (permanent employee of bank could not site because inde-
pendent contractors and directors were not "employees" under statute).
171 117 S. Ct. 660, 664 (1997).
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This approach looks at the number of employees maintained on an
employer's payroll within a given week. 176 If this number is at least 15
for at least 20 weeks, the threshold is met, regardless of whether every
employee on the payroll actually worked on every day of the calendar
week. 176
The payroll method could easily be applied to independent con-
tractors. An independent contractor and, where applicable, its employ-
ees, would be counted towards the jurisdictional minimum in a man-
ner identical to the way in which traditional employees are counted.
For example, if an independent contractor had assigned three employ-
ees to a worksite on a given week, those three workers would be
counted towards the minimum.
This recommendation is consistent with our overall thesis that
independent contractors should be treated like employees under fed-
eral employment discrimination laws. In fact, to not count independent
contractors towards the jurisdictional minimum would defeat a pri-
mary purpose of our proposed amendments by encouraging employers
to classify their workers as independent contractors in order to avoid
these statutes.'"
C. Cross-Classification Claims
Without further guidance, the creation of a separate classification
for independent contractors rather than simply subsuming them into
the definition of employee raises the possibility that independent con-
tractors will sue for compensation and treatment equal to that of
employees. For example, consider the possibility of a cross-classifica-
tion claim under Title VII. Suppose a company decides to expand its
physical plant, and to meet the needs of that new section, it contracts
out part of its janitorial work. The current janitors are full-time em-
ployees, all male, earning an average of fifteen dollars per hour plus
benefits. All will be retained.
However, for the additional janitorial work in the new section in
the plant, the company hires a contractor staffed solely by women. The
women will earn an average of ten dollars per hour without benefits.
Does this arrangement create a systemic disparate treatment or impact
claim under Title VII?
175 See id.
176 See id. at 665-66.
177 Should our proposal become law, we hope that states would follow suit to amend, wherever
necessary, their employment discrimination statutes to allow independent contractors to pursue
claims against employers who fall below the federal statutory minimums,
March 1997]	 INDEPENDENT CON77{ACTOBS	 271
If there is discriminatory intent on the employer's part for class-
ifying the men as employees and the women as independent contrac-
tors, then there is no valid policy reason for precluding a discrimina-
tion lawsuit on behalf of the women. Furthermore, if the company has
adopted a facially-neutral employment practice (i.e., "All hires for
janitorial services for the new section will be on an independent con-
tract basis") that nevertheless discriminates against the women, then
there is no reason why the women should be automatically precluded
from bringing a disparate impact claim.
However, where there is a disparate impact claim in such cases,
the availability of something akin to the business necessity defense
becomes a major issue. 178
 With this defense, an employer could raise
economic reasons for hiring new workers as independent contractors.
Without this defense, any amendment that adds independent contrac-
tors as a separate classification of worker could open the door for
federal discrimination laws to be used as a back-door equal pay law for
independent contractors vis-a-vis employees, at least whenever the in-
dependent contractors are members of a protected class.
There are valid reasons for not permitting the statutes to be used
in this way. If the purpose of discrimination law is to combat discrimi-
nation, then it should not serve as a general purpose weapon against
the disturbing trend towards greater reliance on independent contrac-
tors and contingent labor, and any effort to limit the ability of a com-
pany to contract out its work for broader reasons'of economic fairness
should be dealt with more directly. In addition, allowing the statute to
be used in this way would yield an ironically discriminatory result, for
workers who are not in a protected group would have no like cause of
action under the statute.
The Perritt proposal of redefining any independent contractor
who does not have employees of her own as a statutory employee raises
even greater policy problems concerning cross-classification claims.rm
Under this approach, the solo independent contractor would be
deemed an employee and thus afforded a legal status equal to that of
178 1'4le VII provides that in disparate impact cases, a defendant may avoid liability by estab-
lishing that the challenged employment practice is 'job related finr the position and consistent
with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1) (A) (1994). For general analyses of the business
necessity defense, see Susan S. Grover, The Business Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimi-
nation Crises, 30 GA. L. Rio.. 387 (1996); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity
Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479
(1996).
179 See Perrin, supra note 14, at 1039.
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a more traditional employee, whereas an independent contractor with
workers on her payroll would receive absolutely no protection.' 8°
Concededly, the economic realities test would obviate much of
the difficulty concerning cross-classification claims in that the initial
threshold finding of who is an employee would, if answered affirma-
tively, automatically put the independent contractor-turned-employee
on equal footing with any "regular" employee. However, as noted
above, the economic realities test is hardly an easy one to apply and,
like the Perrin approach, is likely to exclude many individuals from
protection without good reason.' 81
D. Temporary Help Agencies
The growth of temporary help agencies not only reflects the
general expansion of the contingent workforce, but also raises the
important issue of whether workers who are hired and paid by these
agencies can maintain a discrimination action against the companies
to whom they are Jeased.' 82 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York, in the leading case of Amarnare v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., addressed this question
within the context of a motion for dismissal and concluded that it
would be possible for someone to be an employee of both a temporary
help agency and a firm that leased that individual's services.'" The
dispute involved a worker who was employed by a temporary help
agency and sent to work at Merrill Lynch.'" Merrill Lynch discharged
her after two weeks, claiming that her work was unsatisfactory.' 85 The
worker filed suit under Title VIL alleging that she was discharged
without cause or warning, and that no white workers were treated in
that manner.' 88
The plaintiff was paid by the temporary help agency yet subject
to the control of Merrill Lynch.'" The court applied the "loaned
180 See id.
181 See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
182 For contrasting viewpoints concerning the statutory rights of temporary help agency
workers and leased employees generally, compare Temporary Employment and Me Imbalance of
Power; Developments—Employment Discrimination, 109 1-Inity. L. RE.v. 1568, 1647 (1996) with H.
Lane Dennard, Jr. Herbert R. Northrup, Leased Employment: Character, Numbers, and Labor
Law Problems, 28 GA. L. Rix. 683 (1994).
183 61 1 F. Stipp. 344, 349-50 (8.1).N.V. 1984), affd, 770 F.2c1 157 (2d Cir. 1985).
184 See id. at 346.
185 See id.
186 See id.
187 See id. at 349.
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servant doctrine," a common-law rule which "provides that an em-
ployee directed or permitted to perform services for another 'special'
employer may become that employer's employee while performing
those services." 188 The court cited favorably other cases applying the
rule in which the courts concluded that someone could be an em-
ployee of two entities, and it held that the plaintiff's allegations that
she was an employee of both the temporary help agency and Merrill
Lynch were sufficient to deny Merrill Lynch's motion to dismiss)"
In addition, the Amarnare court held that the plaintiff could also
raise a Title VII claim on the ground that Merrill Lynch "allegedly
interfered with her employment opportunities" with the temporary
help agency. m) Recognizing that other courts have permitted Title VII
suits against parties "who are neither actual nor potential direct em-
ployers of particular complainants, but who control access to such em-
ployment and who deny such access by reference to invidious criteria,"
the court concluded that Merrill Lynch may have interfered with the
plaintiff's employment relationship with the temporary help agency.m
The broad remedial goals of the statutory amendments we pro-
pose in this Article require that the rationale of Amarnare he incorpo-
rated into their application. Although technically the temporary help
agency is the main independent contractor in such a situation, the
right to pursue a discrimination claim should vest in both the agency
and the worker.
This is the least that could be done for an individual who would
be placed in a difficult position, for it is possible that a temporary help
agency would face conflicting priorities and thus be ambivalent about
pursuing a claim on the worker's beliall. 192
 On the one hand, the
agency might want to pursue a discrimination claim for both altruistic
and business reasons. On the other hand, it may fear the loss of
I Amarnare, 611 E Sapp, at 349.
in9
um
'In Id.; see also Sibley v. Memorial Ilosp,, 483 F.2d 1333, 1342 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (raking
interference with employment. theory).
192 Advocates for temporary help workers have expressed concerns over such possibilities.
For example, Paul Chapman, Executive Director of The Workplace Project, a non-prolit organi-
za tion established to assist temporary workers, has warned that complaining about discrimination
to a temporary help agency may result in the agency ceasing to provide work opportunities for
the complainant. See The Rights of Temporary Workers, No Mom,: Jolts, Sept. Oct., 1996. at I. In
addition, the editor of Temp Slave!, a small-circulation magazine by and about temporary workers,
reports that lolne temp placement Aker said, 'One client called and asked Its not 10 send any
black people, and we didn't. We do whatever the clients want, whether it's right or wrong.'
Another reports client requests for 'blond bombshells' or 'people without accents.'" Kell°, TEm
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business from a firm that is facing a discrimination complaint from
one of the agency's leased workers. In such a case, the worker should
have the right to bring the complaint individually. In such circum-
stances, the worker should also be protected from discrimination or
retaliation by the temporary help agency for independently pursuing
a claim against the firm that leased her services.
CONCLUSION
Although the process of gathering labor market data on inde-
pendent contractors is still in its infancy, it is fair to say that the number
of workers who possibly fall into this category is well in the millions
and growing. The common-law test to determine employee status ex-
cludes many of these individuals from the protections of federal dis-
crimination laws, and the hybrid and pure economic realities tests
perform only marginally better. Amending the primary employment
discrimination statutes to explicitly include independent contractors is
the best way to protect these workers in the midst of a changing labor
market.
